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old.  Using an overlapping generations framework in which agents are three-period lived but 
timing of death in the third period is uncertain, we analyze the effects of social security tax 
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I.  Introduction 
In the last decades of the twentieth century the economies of the industrialized nations 
have seen their populations age and their trend rates of growth slow.  Either phenomenon alone 
could place the viability of unfunded social security schemes in doubt; both together could place 
such schemes in crisis (Weaver, 1992).  This premonition of crisis motivated the 1994-1996 
Advisory Council on Social Security to consider radical changes to the Social Security system to 
prevent the necessity of raising taxes to keep the system in actuarial balance.1  The political 
feasibility of tax increases, largely eschewed by the Advisory Council and in the political debate 
that has followed, is certainly open to question.  Yet, as Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1990) note, the 
retirees who benefit from these tax increases are a powerful political force.2   Before taxes or the 
social security system itself are changed we must consider the long-term effects of changes to the 
social security system not only on the politically active old but on society as a whole. 
To assess the viability of a social security system one cannot examine this single 
intergenerational transfer in isolation, but must examine the panoply of intergenerational transfers 
that defines an individual’s life.  Parents make inter vivos transfers not only to their aged parents 
by subsidizing their parents’ retirement via the payment of social security taxes, but also to their 
children by educating them.  Aged parents leave bequests to their adult children.  Clearly, the 
needs of aged parents and young children compete.  What this competition implies for the future 
of social security is the question we seek to answer. 
Using an overlapping generations framework, as developed in the works of Allais (1947), 
Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965), in which agents are three- period lived but the timing of 
death in the third period is uncertain, we analyze the effects of a number of social security tax 
                                                 
1  Aaron and Burtless (1989) estimated that social security taxes will have to rise by as much as 23% to 
keep the system in the United States solvent over the next 75 years, making social security an even large 
component of public spending. 
2  Congleton and Shugart (1990), in contrast, find that most changes in social security benefits can be 
traced to changes in constraints faced by the median voter rather than the political power of special interest 
groups. 
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schemes, under various demographic assumptions, on physical capital accumulation, the 
education provided to children by their parents, social welfare, and economic growth.  
In common with many models of social security, our model looks at social security as a 
mechanism to effect intergenerational exchange.3   However, our model differs from many 
models of pay-as-you-go social security systems (see, for example, Samuelson (1958), Diamond, 
(1977), Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines (1992), among others) in that these models ignore 
child welfare issues when assessing the effects of various social security programs and/or tax 
rates on capital accumulation and social welfare.  Other work, while not ignoring children, 
assumes that expenditures on children are entirely tax financed, as in Wildasin (1991), or claims 
that human capital formation is independent of direct expenditures on children as in Sala-i-Martin 
(1992).  Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) make education decisions central to their analysis, but 
abstract from any spillovers of these decisions on the utility of the aged.  Caballé (1995) also 
makes education expenditures central to his analysis, and altruistically links parents to children 
throughout their lives.  But, in his model children are not called upon to fund their parents’ 
retirement.  In our model the interactions between social security programs and parents’ decisions 
concerning their children’s education play a central role through the effects of human capital 
formation on labor productivity, and through this channel on economic growth.4  Our analyses 
show clearly that social security can crowd out education, and, thereby, reduce capital 
accumulation, growth, and social welfare.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In section II we develop the general model.  
In section III we define the equilibrium generically, and then analyze the steady-state equilibrium 
in section IV, and equilibrium balanced growth paths, under specific functional form 
assumptions, in section V.  In section V special attention is paid to the welfare implications of 
                                                 
3  See Kotlikoff (1987) and Diamond (1977) for discussion of the various rationales for social security.   
4  For other models in which growth is generated via human capital development see Lucas (1988) and 
Caballé (1995). 
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changes in tax policies and demographics.  We conclude the paper in section VI with a summary 
of our findings and a discussion of their implications. 
 
II.  The Environment 
Consider an infinitely-lived economy comprised of identical three-period lived agents, 
perfectly competitive firms, and a government.  At each date t = 1, 2, 3,..., a new generation 
(called generation t) of N(t) agents is born.  Assume N(t) = (1+n(t))N(t-1), N(0) given.   
 
Consumers 
Agents in the first period of their lives, the young, are endowed with one unit of time that 
they combine with the education provided by their parents to develop their human capital.  This 
education is an in kind inter vivos transfer; it can neither be transformed into physical capital nor 
consumption.  Such parental educational inputs have been shown to be a crucial determinant of 
children’s educational attainment (Black, 1998), while other forms of educational spending have 
not been shown consistently to have such positive effects (Hanushek, 1997).  Agents in the 
second period of their lives, the middle-aged, supply their effective labor, the product of their one 
unit of time and their human capital developed in youth, inelastically to firms.5   They divide their 
income between educating their 1+n children, current consumption, saving for consumption 
when old, and payment of social security taxes.  Agents in the final period of their lives, the old, 
supply their savings inelastically to firms and consume their social security benefits and the their 
accumulated savings.  With probability p(t) an old agent born at date t will live throughout old 
                                                 
5 Reimers (1992) suggests that social security programs lead to intertemporal substitution of labor so that 
agents work more while young, and retire earlier than in the absence of a social security scheme.  We 
choose to model this as an inelastic labor supply during middle age and then forced retirement at the 
commencement of old age.  Because we have abstracted from issues concerning labor supply choice, we 
also ignore the issues of social security as a way to improve the average level of skill in the economy 
addressed by Sala-i-Martin (1992). 
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age, and with probability 1-p(t) an old agent will die at the onset of old age.6   If an agent dies at 
the onset of old age, his savings are bequeathed to his children.   
Let the representative member of generation t’s preferences be represented by 
(1) ))1(())1(1())2(()())1(()( +++++++= tehtntcvtptcutU tt δβ  
where u(), v() and h() are all twice continuously differentiable, increasing, concave functions, 
 is consumption by a member of generation t when middle-aged, and c  is 
consumption by a member of generation t when old.  Further, β>0 is the rate of time preference.  
While children do not get utility while being educated, parents get utility from educating them.  
Their utility is derived from their "love of" or "duty to" their children rather than any personal 
return they may reap from their investment or any other strategic motive (see Cremer, et al., 
1992).  This inter vivos bequest motive encompasses the lifetime bequest motive.
)1( +tct )2( +tt
7  Since agents 
do not know when they will die, additional unintentional bequests may be forthcoming.8   
 Assuming exogenous fertility and an altruistic bond between parents and their children 
runs counter to the empirical findings of Cigno and Rosati (1996).  They find that parents are 
self-interested and choose their saving and fertility without regard to their offspring.  Our model 
differs from theirs in that in ours there is uncertainty about the timing of death, hence we cannot 
rule out unintentional end-of-life bequests (whether there is a bequest motive or not), and is 
general rather than partial equilibrium in nature, while abstracting from the fertility choice.  
However, if we alter our model by removing the altruistic bond between parents and children (by 
                                                 
6 In this model agents face uncertainty about the time of death but not about the maximum possible length 
of life. Thus, agents may die before they have exhausted their non-social security wealth, but not vice 
versa. 
7 While other models endogenize both expenditures on children and bequests, e.g. Nishmura and Zhang 
(1992, 1995), they assume that income and interest rates are exogenous.  In our model, where wages and 
interest rates are endogenous, introducing an end-of-life bequest motive makes the analysis intractable.   
8 The assumption of unintentional rather than altruistic end-of-life bequests is consistent with the empirical 
findings of numerous researchers: see Hurd (1989, 1990), Auerbach, et al. (1992), and Borsh-Supan 
(1993), as well as the finding by Altonji, et al. (1992) that parents and their adult children are not 
altruistically linked.  But, other research finds an operative bequest motive (Hamermesh and Menchik 
(1987) and Hurd (1995)).  In contrast, Laitner and Juster (1996) find support for intergenerational altruism 
but note that it is not the major explanation for saving.   
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assuming δ=0) and replacing it with intergenerational education loans, then the same results can 
be derived under similar conditions on the tax function, introduced below.  Thus, while the bond 
between parent and child is an integral part of our model, our steady-state results generalize to a 
model where altruism plays no role.9   
If a parent invests  in each child’s education, each child will enter the labor force 
with units of human capital, since all of a child’s time will be spent gaining an 
education.  That is, the education production function converts the unit of a child’s time 
combined with the units of education expenditure into h units of human capital.  
Thus, the utility a parent at date t+1 receives from educating his dependent children is 
)1( +te
))1(( +teh
))1( +t
)1( +te ))1(( +te
(ehδ , where and δ is the weight placed on the utility a parent receives from educating his 
children.10    
If an agent dies at the onset of his old age, his accumulated savings, (1+r(t+1))s(t), are 
bequeathed in full to his heirs.  To maintain the representative agent formulation, bequests  
(2) 
)(1
)())1(1))(1(1()1(
tn
tstrtptB
+
++−−
=+   
are equally divided among all the middle aged.  Thus, the bequest dependent wealth distribution 
is uniform, as in Hubbard and Judd (1987).  This assumption allows us to conduct a 
representative agent analysis, and restricts uncertainty to the timing of death alone, which allows 
us to focus more clearly on the effects of changes in expected longevity.    
 
 
 
                                                 
9 This model and the results it implies are available from the authors upon request. 
10 Our formulation is in contrast to Barro (1974) and other explicitly or implicitly dynastic models, such as 
Ehrlich and Lui (1991), in which parents internalize the lifetime utility of their children.  In these models 
the effects of changes in taxes are negated via changes in bequests, and so are ill-suited to analyzing social 
security schemes.  Our formulation is similar to the parent-child utility linkage assumed in Boldrin (1993).  
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Firms 
The firms are perfectly competitive profit maximizers that produce output using the 
constant returns to scale production function Y , where 
 0 .   is the capital stock at t+1 which 
depreciates fully in the production process.   is the effective labor input at t+1, 
, where  is labor hours, the productivity of which is augmented by the 
worker’s human capital, .   is a time independent productivity scalar.   The intensive 
form production function is , where lower case variables are per 
capita values. 
))1(),1(()1( ++=+ tHtKAFt
)1( +tK
)1( +tH
))1(),1 ++ tht
,0 ,0 ,0 >>> KHHK FFF
))(()()1( tehtNtH =+
h
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)(tN
))(( te A
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The individual firm takes wages and rental rates as given.  It hires effective labor and 
capital until their marginal products equal their factor prices 
(3)   )1())1(),1(( +=++ twthtkAfh
(4)  . )1())1(),1(( +=++ trthtkAfk
 
The Government 
The government in this economy imposes a proportional wage tax, τ, on the middle-aged.  
The wage tax rate is expressed as a nondecreasing function of the aged-dependency ratio, 
)(1
)(
)1(
)()(
tn
tp
tN
tptN
+
=
+
, the ratio of old agents who receive social security benefits, to middle aged 
agents paying social security taxes.11   The government must fully fund all expenditures with tax 
                                                                                                                                                                 
We adopt it specifically so that we can study the effect changes in the social security system, in response to 
demographic changes, have on investment in education. 
11 This parameterization is an attempt to impose a functional relationship on the political process under 
which taxes are set.  The relationship is motivated by the empirical finding that the social security tax rate 
and the aged-dependency ratio are strongly positively correlated, and by the fact that the Social Security 
Administration's Office of the Chief Actuary uses the aged-dependency ratio as a proxy for the cost of the 
system. Further, this functional relationship is consistent with the empirical finding by Poterba and 
Summers (1986) that as the population ages the costs of social security programs rise.  It is also consistent 
with Aaron and Burtless's (1989) finding that the US Congress tends to legislate changes in social security 
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receipts:  it must maintain a balanced budget.  Thus, total social security benefits paid, T , 
must equal total revenues from wage taxes 
)2( +t
))
())2())1(()1()2()()( τ+++=+ twtehtNtTtptN ,  
implying that  
(5)  
)(
())2())1(())1(1()2(
tp
twtehtnt τ++++=+T . 
 
III.  Equilibrium 
Definition:  A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a sequence of prices 
 a sequence of allocations {  and a sequence of education 
expenditures and physical capital stocks, { , e(-1) > 0 and k(0) > 0 given, such that 
given these prices and allocations, agents’ utility is maximized, firms’ profits are maximized, the 
government budget constraint is satisfied, and markets clear.   
∞
=
++ 0)}1(),1({ ttrtw
∞
=
++ 0)}2(),1( ttt tctc
∞
=
− 0)}(),1 ttk(te
The representative agent born at time t takes as given his human capital, , the 
wage faced in middle age, w(t+1), the return on saving when old, r(t+2), the tax rate function, 
τ(p(t-1)/(1+n(t)), 0
(( teh
()' >τ , social security benefits, T(t+2), bequests from his parents, B(t+1), and 
chooses saving, s(t+1),  and expenditures on each of his children’s educations, e(t+1), to 
maximize (1) subject to  
(6)  )1()1())1(1()1()
)(1
)1(1)(1())(()1( +++++−+−



+
−
−+=+ tBtetnts
tn
tptwtehtct τ   
(7)   )2()1())2(1()2( +++++=+ tTtstrtct
where constraint (6) encompasses the assumption that bequests are allocated equally across all 
members of a generation.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
taxes or benefits to keep the system in balance.  This suggests a tax schedule that is a function of the aged-
dependency ratio. 
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Substituting constraints (6) and (7) into the objective function (1) and maximizing yields 
the first-order conditions of the agent’s problem with respect to saving and education 
expenditures, respectively: 
(8) 0()'))2(1)((()' =+++− vtrtpu β  
(9) 0()'()' =+− hu δ   
The goods market clears when demand for goods equals supply of goods, so saving today 
determines the capital stock tomorrow:  
(10)  . )1())(1()( ++= tktnts
 
IV. The Steady State  
Assume that all parameters are time independent so that p(t) = p for all t, etc.  Steady-
state equilibrium is represented by 
(11)  0)('))2(1)(()(' =+++− om cvtrtpcu β
(12)   0)(')(' =+− ehcu m δ
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Totally differentiating (11) and (12) with respect to the tax rate and demographic 
parameters yields the following system: 
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Assume the determinant of the left hand side matrix is positive, ∆>0, and that 
 and .  Comparative static results at an interior, stable, 
steady-state equilibrium are contained in the following propositions. 
0]"''[ >+ oekkh cvfvhfpβ 0"" <+− hcu me δ
 
Proposition 1:  Assume τ() = τ, constant for all p and n.  Then, economies with higher tax rates, 
τ, have lower steady-state physical capital stocks and lower private education expenditures if the 
economy is dynamically efficient.   
Proof: [ ] 0]"''[""""]""[1 <+−++−−
∆
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o
ekkk
mmo
k
m
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τ τττ
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since  if the economy is dynamically efficient. 0)1( and ,0 ,0 >+−>< nfcc k
om
ττ
  
The higher tax rate implies that the income of the middle aged is lower, all else equal, 
and social security benefits for the old are higher.  When agents expect to receive higher benefits 
they save less.  The direct income effect reduces expenditures in all expenditure classes.  Thus, 
all else equal, higher tax rates imply a smaller physical capital stock, a result common in the 
literature, and a reduction in parent’s expenditures on their children’s education leading to a 
smaller human capital stock.  This suggests that programs designed to benefit the elderly can hurt 
the young, both directly by reducing their education, so their human capital, and indirectly by 
reducing the capital that will be available when they enter the work force.  This result clearly 
shows that social security crowds out the parental input to education.  
 
Proposition 2:  Economies in which agents have longer expected lifetimes, higher p, have lower 
physical capital stocks if the sum of the longevity and transfer effects is positive, 
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0]"'[ >+− opk cpvvfβ
c
which necessitates a steep tax function, .  Also, they have lower 
education expenditures if the above conditions hold and consumption while young is increasing 
in the capital stock, . 
0>opc
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There are several conflicting effects:  a positive longevity effect, a negative bequest 
effect, a negative tax effect on the middle-aged and a positive or negative transfer effect on the 
old.  Higher expected longevity increases the incentive to save to fund a longer retirement.12  
Higher longevity, however, reduces unintentional bequests, which reduces expected income for 
middle-aged agents, leading to reductions in saving and parents’ expenditures on their children’s 
education.  Increased taxes, as a result of longer life expectancy, reduce the middle aged’s 
income, compounding the negative bequest effect, and increase or decrease transfers received 
when old depending on the slope of the tax function.  The longevity, bequest and tax effects 
together may lead either to higher or lower saving and parental education expenditures.13  
However, if the transfer effect is large and positive enough to outweigh the longevity effect then 
                                                 
12   We assume that an increase in longevity results in an increase in the length of retirement rather than an 
increase in the lengths of middle and old age.  This is consistent with Hamermesh (1984) who finds that 
workers who live longer do not work more than their shorter-lived colleagues. 
13 Our results concerning population aging here and below are in contrast to Meijdam and Verbon (1997) 
since they define population aging as a decrease in the population growth rate, while we define it as an 
increase in expected lifespan holding the population growth rate constant, or as a decrease in the population 
growth rate holding the expected lifetime constant. 
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the transfer, tax and bequest effects can together lead to lower rates of physical and human capital 
accumulation:  social security crowds out education.    
 
Proposition 3:  Economies with higher population growth rates (n) have lower  per capita 
physical capital stocks if the tax rate is fixed so c  and , and higher human capital 
stocks if the tax function is flat enough so  but  and consumption in middle age is 
decreasing in the capital stock, c . 
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There are again several conflicting effects:  a negative family size effect on the middle 
aged, a positive family size effect on the old, a positive tax effect on the young and a negative 
transfer effect on the old.  Ignoring the tax/transfer effects, physical capital accumulation falls.  
This is because, for a fixed tax rate, transfers will rise, reducing the incentive to save.  If the tax 
rate is sensitive to changes in the aged-dependency ratio, the tax/transfer effects may increase 
income when middle-aged and when old.  Both effects increase lifetime income, so increase the 
incentive to invest in education. This suggests that a reduction in the aged-dependency ratio, and 
thereby the social security tax rate, may allow education to crowd in. 
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V.  Growth 
In this model parents fund their children’s education, and in so doing plant the seeds for 
growth.   This theoretical position is supported by Barro and Lee’s (1993) empirical findings of a 
positive relationship between educational attainment and economic growth.  To examine 
economic growth we must impose functional form restrictions.  We assume that  
))1(ln())1(1())2(ln()())1(ln()( +++++++= tetntctptctU tt δβ  
αα −++=+ 1)1()1()1( tHtAKtY  
so .  Under these functional form assumptions, the conditions for growth are 
established in proposition 4.  
)1())1(( +=+ teteh
 
Proposition 4:  If U ))1(ln())1(1())2(ln()())1(ln()( +++++++= tetntctptct tt δβ  and  
αα −++=+ 1)1()1()1( tHtAKtY , then for A large enough, the economy will exhibit balanced 
growth.   
Proof:  Define 
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From equations (8) and (9) and under the functional form assumptions 
(13) )2()1()1( ++=+ tktte φ . 
Substitute (13) and (13) lagged one period into (8) to yield 
(14) . )1()1()2( ++=+ tktgtk
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This economy will exhibit balanced growth if g(t+1)>1 for all t, which will be satisfied for A 
large enough. 
 
We now examine the effects of demographic shifts on economic growth and social 
welfare.  We conduct three distinct simulation experiments:  a baby- boom, a sustained decrease 
in the population growth rate, and a sustained increase in the aged-dependency ratio.   In each of 
these exercises we are careful to analyze the transitional effects of the changes on education 
expenditures, physical capital accumulation and social welfare.  In each of our experiments we 
examine two policy regimes.  The first, Regime A, holds the social security tax rate constant; this 
holds the cost of the program as a percentage of GNP fixed.  The second, Regime B, changes the 
tax as dictated by the tax function; this increases transfers as the period of retirement lengthens, 
and decreases the tax rate as the aged-dependency ratio falls.  
The simulations use a calibrated version of the model in which many of the parameters 
chosen reflect the empirical findings of previous authors.  Details of the calibration exercise are 
found in the appendix. The simulations begin with arbitrary starting values for e(1) and k(2) and a 
growth path is generated given the initial parameter values.  Then the simulation is repeated with 
starting values on the balanced growth path.  In each experiment the simulation begins on the 
baseline growth path and stays there unperturbed for the first four periods.  In period five the 
system is perturbed and the economy is observed over the remaining periods in the simulation 
run.   The tables can be read as follows.  The period represents the date of birth of a generation.  
So, in Table 1, for example, the column headed by 4 lists economic activity when the members of 
generation 4 are middle aged:  education expenditures per (generation 5) child, education as a 
percentage of GNP in period 5, transfers to the members of generation 3 as a percentage of GNP 
in period 5, saving as a percentage of GNP in period 5, output per worker in period 5, lifetime 
utility of a member of generation 4, and annualized growth rate of output between generations 4 
and 5.  
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To simulate a baby boom we set n(t) at its baseline level for periods 1 - 4.  In period 5 we 
increase the population growth rate by 10%.  In period 6 and in all subsequent periods, n(t) 
returns to its initial value.  The baby boom forces the economy onto a lower growth path, while 
benefiting the parents of the boomers (generation 4) in both tax regimes.  During the baby-boom 
generation, the per child education expenditure falls, although total education expenditures rise.  
Saving rises, but the additional capital is insufficient to offset the reductions in education, so 
baby-boomers have lower expected lifetime income than their parents enjoyed.  This loss of 
income is adequate to force the economy onto a lower growth path, but one with the same rate of 
balanced growth, even when the tax rate adjusts in response to the new lower aged-dependency 
ratio.  From the perspective of the parents of the baby-boomers, those born at date 4, the preferred 
tax regime holds taxes fixed, since this nets them the highest transfers, but reduces their incentive 
to save.  This reduced incentive to save, as a result of the social security system, indirectly hurts 
their children by leaving them with less capital to work with thereby reducing the value of their 
education.  Thus the boomers and their progeny would prefer the aged-dependency ratio sensitive 
tax as this would cause the boomers to face a lower tax rate, save more, and give their children a 
better start in life.  See Table 1.  
To simulate a sustained decrease in the population growth rate we reduce n(5) to 90% of 
the baseline growth rate.  This lower population growth rate pushes the economy onto a higher 
growth path with a higher rate of economic growth.  This is because the parents of the initial 
smaller generation increase per child education expenditures, and in regime A save more, 
increasing the capital with which their children will work.  In both regimes these children face an 
expected lifetime income higher than the baseline when they reach middle age, and so they 
endow each of their children with more education and, in tax regime A, save more. The positive 
impact of the higher education expenditures soon generates an increase in economic growth in 
both regimes and individual well-being in regime A relative to the baseline.  In this scenario all 
generations, save the first with the smaller family size who prefer an aged-dependency ratio 
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sensitive tax rate, agree that the best tax regime is that in which the social security tax is held 
fixed, since by holding the tax rate constant social security is prevented from crowding out 
education.  In this tax regime the growth effects of the decline in population growth are strongest, 
but these are effects from which the first generation does not benefit.  See Table 2.  
The long-run result of lower population growth found here differs from the results of the 
Solow growth model with exogenous technological progress.  There, output per worker grows at 
the rate of technological progress and is independent of the growth rate of the labor force.  Here, 
in contrast, parents respond to the lower population growth rate by increasing expenditures on 
each child’s education and saving more, at the per child level, which generates the intuitive and 
empirically valid result that each child is then endowed with more human and physical capital, 
thus increasing the rate of technological progress.  This gives a decrease in the population growth 
rate both a positive level effect, as in the Solow model, and a positive trend growth effect. 
To simulate the increase in the aged-dependency ratio to about that projected for 2040, 
the probability of living throughout old age is doubled in period 5.  When the aged-dependency 
ratio rises, holding the tax rate constant, agents save more to fund their longer lives and to 
compensate for the loss of social security transfers.  This leads them to reduce per child education 
expenditures.  However, their higher rate of saving more than compensates their children for the 
reallocation of resources away from education, leaving their children better off financially than in 
the baseline.  Thus, the economy is placed on a higher growth path with a higher rate of balanced 
growth.  If taxes are not held constant and rise with the aged-dependency ratio, tax regime B, the 
disincentives to saving are heightened.  In this regime it is possible that, after tax, the children of 
the initial generation of longer-lived agents will spend less on each of their children’s education 
and will not save enough to make up the difference, forcing the economy onto a lower growth 
path with a substantially lower balanced growth rate of 1.6% annually in Regime B, rather than 
2.5% in the baseline, or 2.9% annually when the tax rate is held constant in Regime A.  This 
result suggests that the effects on long-term growth and on social welfare of the current 
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Congressional practice of raising Social Security taxes as the population ages, using the aged-
dependency ratio as a guide, could be misguided, although popular among older constituents, as it 
crowds out education and weakens the incentive to save.  See Table 3.  
 
VI.  Conclusion 
In this paper we have developed a model in which the education of the young and the 
financial support of the old interact.  In the absence of exogenous technological change, we find 
that population aging may engender intergenerational conflict since the most preferred tax policy 
of the initial generation, higher social security taxes and transfers, is generally not that of 
subsequent generations because social security crowds out education, a key to economic growth 
and improved social welfare.  Further, social welfare considerations may get lost when it is the 
generosity of the program and not the welfare of either current or future beneficiaries that takes 
center stage when adjustments are considered.  This is because the passage of time magnifies the 
crowding out effects, and planners’ time horizons are often short.  
Before policy recommendations can be made, four caveats, one strengthening and three 
weakening these results, should be mentioned.  First, increases in social security benefits today 
benefit those already retired and those who are soon to retire.  Thus as the population ages the 
percentage of the voting population in favor of social security benefit, therefore tax, increases 
will rise.  This situation is both acute and politically volatile in countries like Italy, Switzerland, 
Germany, and the United States that expect to see aged-dependency ratios in excess of .4 by the 
year 2030.  Second, our model does not take into account uncertainty concerning bequest receipt.  
Weil (1993) shows that when bequests are uncertain saving (and, implicitly, in the framework of 
our model, education expenditures) falls less fast as the population ages than in models in which 
bequests are treated as certain.  Thus, the effects of population aging found in our model may be 
overstated.  Third, the old may save, and thus increased expected life span may increase the 
savings accumulated while old.  Finally, when average life span increases agents may choose to 
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work longer, leaving the aged-dependency ratio fixed thereby nullifying the effects of population 
aging.  However, as the populations of the US and European countries have aged, absent changes 
in laws governing Old Age Pensions and Social Security, the proportion of the aged working has 
actually decreased, increasing rather than decreasing the effects of aging on economic behavior. 
Overall our model sounds a note of caution.  In caring for our current aged we should not 
short change either our current young or our future aged.  This will require policy makers to 
change their way of thinking, and to recognize that a more generous program does not necessarily 
imply greater social welfare.  Having realized this, they may make decisions that, while for the 
greater good, may run counter to the wishes of some of their most vocal constituents, which is, at 
best, a thankless task. 
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Appendix 
Choice of Parameter Values 
 
For our baseline simulations we take a generation to be twenty years in length and set 
α=.3,  δ=.1 and β=.67=.9820.  Further, we let n(t)=.22 (=(1.01)20-1) and p(t-1)= .26108, since this 
combination yields the current aged-dependency ratio of slightly less than .214 (1993 Annual 
Report of the Federal OASDI Trust Fund).  Our selection of α is a compromise between the high 
a value estimated by Prescott (1986) for capital’s share of national income, and the lower 
estimates made by the Council of Economic Advisors (1994) which ranged from α=.24 in 1982 
to α=.27 for several years in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  We found that the choice of δ had 
little effect on the simulation, so we assumed a low value: parent’s do not dote on their children. 
Our value of β is based on the single period discount rate found by Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff (1987) of .98, and is similar to that found by Kydland and Prescott (1992) of .96.  Since 
the agents in our model plan over generations that span 20 years, we discount the future by .9820. 
For those simulations in which the tax rate is constant we set τ=.09 which generates a 
social security replacement rate, the benefit to wage ratio, of .42, the current rate for the average 
wage earner according the Social Security Office of the Chief Actuary.  For those simulations in 
which the tax function is a function of the aged-dependency ratio, τ = .2[p(t-1)/(1+n(t))] + 
1.0306577[p(t-1)/(1+n(t))] , where the constants are chosen so that the tax rate equals .09 at the 
current aged-dependency ratio.  This tax function is convex in the aged-dependency ratio and was 
chosen to be consistent with the findings of Poterba and Summers (1986).   While this baseline 
tax rate appears to be low, at about one percentage point below the current OAS tax rate of 
10.2%, it reflects the fact that the Social Security System is currently running a surplus so that all 
tax revenues are not distributed. Given these parameter values, the productivity constant A is 
calculated to guarantee an annual growth rate of 2.5% (a generational growth rate of .63862).  
Depending upon the historical period of interest, the literature presents many possible 
choices for the rate of growth of the U.S. economy.  Madison (1987) finds the average annual 
compound growth rates of GDP in the U.S. to be 4.2% from 1870-1973, and 2.3% from 1973-
1984.  In addition, he finds the annual rate of GDP growth per person employed to be 4.25% 
from 1950-1973 and 1.72% from 1973-1984.  In contrast, DeLong and Summers (1991) find the 
annual growth of GDP per worker to be 1.33% from 1960 - 1985.  Finally, Boskin (1988) cites 
the following annual growth rates of real GNP:  3.7% from 1948-1973, 2.2% from 1973 - 1981, 
and 3.3% from 1981-1988.  We choose the growth rate of 2.5% as being a compromise among 
the findings of the various studies. 
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Table 1 
Baby-boom 
 Periods 
→ 
  
Regime↓ 
4 5 6 7 8
Education per child (t+1) Baseline 169.927 278.444 456.264 747.641 1225.10
 Regime 
A 
169.629 276.457 453.006 742.303 1216.35
 Regime 
B 
169.458 277.736 455.103 745.739 1221.98
   
Education(t+1)/GNP(t+1) Baseline .0859 .0859 .0859 .0859 .0859
 Regime 
A 
.0873 .0859 .0859 .0859 .0859
 Regime 
B 
.0875 .0861 .0859 .0859 .0859
   
SS Transfers 
(t+1)/GNP(t+1) 
Baseline 0.063 0.0630 0.063 0.063 0.063
 Regime 
A 
0.063 0.0630 0.063 0.063 0.063
 Regime 
B 
0.063 0.0616 0.063 0.063 0.063
   
Saving(t+1)/GNP(t+1) Baseline 0.0683 0.0683 0.0683 0.0683 0.0683
 Regime 
A 
0.0682 0.0683 0.0683 0.0683 0.0683
 Regime 
B 
0.0687 0.0684 0.0683 0.0683 0.0683
   
Output(t+1)/Worker Baseline 2412.22 3952.70 6476.95 10613.2 17391.0
 Regime 
A 
2412.22 3924.48 6430.71 10537.5 17266.9
 Regime 
B 
2412.22 3934.89 6460.47 10586.2 17346.8
   
Utility(t) Baseline 9.44063 10.0811 10.7216 11.3621 12.0026
 Regime 
A 
9.45177 10.0718 10.7123 11.3528 11.9933
 Regime 
B 
9.44905 10.0835 10.7183 11.3588 11.9993
   
Annualized Growth (%) Baseline 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500
 Regime 
A 
2.500 2.399 2.500 2.500 2.500
 23
 Regime 
B 
2.500 2.477 2.510 2.500 2.500
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Table 2 
10% decline in n 
 Periods 
→ 
  Regime 
↓ 
4 5 6 7 8
Education per child (t+1) Baseline 169.927 278.444 456.264 747.641 1225.10
 Regime A 170.234 280.982 463.779 765.498 1263.50
 Regime B 170.402 279.906 459.780 755.245 1240.58
    
Education(t+1)/GNP(t+1) Baseline .0859 .0859 .0859 .0859 .0859
 Regime A .0845 .0845 .0845 .0845 .0845
 Regime B .0846 .0845 .0858 .0845 .0845
    
SS 
Transfers(t+1)/GNP(t+1) 
Baseline 0.063 0.0630 0.0630 0.0630 0.0630
 Regime A 0.063 0.0630 0.0630 0.0630 0.0630
 Regime B 0.063 0.0651 0.0651 0.0651 0.0651
    
Saving(t+1)/GNP(t+1) Baseline 0.0683 0.0683 0.0683 0.0683 0.0683
 Regime A 0.0685 0.0685 0.0685 0.0685 0.0685
 Regime B 0.0677 0.0675 0.0675 0.0675 0.0675
    
Output(t+1)/Worker Baseline 2412.22 3952.70 6476.95 10613.2 17391.0
 Regime A 2412.22 3981.52 6571.76 10847.1 17903.9
 Regime B 2412.22 3970.56 6522.13 10713.4 17598.1
    
Utility(t) Baseline 9.44063 10.0811 10.7216 11.3621 12.0026
 Regime A 9.42944 10.0783 10.7271 11.3759 12.0247
 Regime B 9.43225 10.0691 10.7117 11.3543 11.9968
    
Annualized Growth (%) Baseline 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500
 Regime A 2.500 2.537 2.537 2.537 2.537
 Regime B 2.500 2.523 2.513 2.513 2.513
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Table 3 
Doubling of the Aged-Dependency Ratio 
 Periods →
  Regime 
↓ 
4 5 6 7 8 
Education(t+1) per child Baseline 169.927 278.444 456.264 747.641 1225.100 
 Regime A 169.927 247.472 434.927 764.376 1343.380 
 Regime B 169.927 265.339 363.254 497.302 680.816 
     
Education(t+1)/GNP(t+1) Baseline .0859 .0859 .0859 .0859 .0859 
 Regime A .0859 .0764 .0694 .0694 .0694 
 Regime B .0859 .0819 .0621 .0621 .0621 
     
SS 
Transfers(t+1)/GNP(t+1) 
Baseline 0.063 0.063 0.0630 0.0630 0.0630 
 Regime A 0.063 0.063 0.0630 0.0630 0.0630 
 Regime B 0.063 0.063 0.1918 0.1918 0.1918 
     
Saving(t+1)/GNP(t+1) Baseline 0.0683 0.0683 0.0683 0.0683 0.0683 
 Regime A 0.0683 0.1562 0.1420 0.1420 0.1420 
 Regime B 0.0683 0.1055 0.0800 0.0800 0.0800 
     
Output(t+1)/Worker Baseline 2412.22 3952.70 6476.95 10613.2 17391.0 
 Regime A 2412.22 3952.70 76440.4 13434.2 23610.4 
 Regime B 2412.22 3952.70 7134.61  9767.4 13371.8 
     
Utility(t) Baseline 9.44063 10.0811 10.7216 11.3621 12.0026 
 Regime A 9.44063 11.3811 12.2110 13.0410 13.8709 
 Regime B 9.44063 11.5969 12.0592 12.5215 12.9839 
     
Annualized Growth (%) Baseline 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 
 Regime A 2.500 2.500 3.353 2.860 2.860 
 Regime B 2.500 2.500 2.997 1.583 1.583 
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